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The second issue is whether or not defendant Pack as the 
1 
assignee of the beneficial interest of defendant Gunterman, was 
a good faith purchaser for valuable consideration. The 
assignment itself, Exhibit 2, recites that the assignment is 
made for value received. Neither defendant Pack nor defendant 
Gunterman were present at trial and there was no testimony as 
to the amount paid for the assignment. No evidence was offered 
to the effect that defendant Pack was not a good faith 
purchaser for value. In 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser §371 it 
states: 
While it has been held that the good faith of purchasers 
of land fraudulently transferred to the grantor cannot be 
presumed, a purchaser for value under a recorded deed is, 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed prima 
facie to be an innocent purchaser in good faith as against 
one claimant under a prior unrecorded deed; and where 
nothing is alleged to the contrary, it has been held that 
it must be assumed that the purchaser is a bona fide 
purchaser for valuable consideration. Where a subsequent 
purchaser first records his deed, it has been held that 
there is a presumption that he acquired his title in good 
faith and without notice of the prior unrecorded 
conveyance. 
In Archuleta v. Anders, 67 N.M. 422, 356 P.2d 443 (1960), 
the court stated: 
The rule is so well established as to need no citation of 
authority, that there is presumption that consideration 
was paid and that the purchaser acted in good faith. 
Accordingly, since there is no allegation that the assigns 
ment was made fraudulently and since there was no evidence to 
indicate that the assignment was not made in good faith and for 
valuable consideration, defendant Pack must be presumed 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff*Appellant, 
vs. 
DANIEL PACK, MARGARET A. 
GUNTERMAN, ACTION TITLE 
COMPANY, Trustee, T.P. FAMILY 
PARTNERSHIP, HOFFBUHER REDI# 
MIX INC., WILLARD M. TUCKER, 
PHYLLIS 0. TUCKER, D LAND TITLE 
COMPANY, and all unknown 
persons who have or claim any 
right, title, estate, lien or 
interest in the subject 
property, 
Defendants^Respondents. 
Case No. 860239 
BRIEF OF APPELLANfT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether or not the recordation of an assignment of the 
deed of trust of defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack prior to 
the recordation of the previously executed deed of reconveyance 
constituted an encumberance upon plaintiff's title to the 
subject property. 
2. Whether or not plaintiff's costs, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, in prosecuting an action to quiet 
title to the subject property is a proper element of damage to 
be awarded for the negligence of defendant D Land Title Company 
in failing to record the deed of reconveyance within a 
reasonable time after its execution thereof. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to 
approximately 10 acres of land located in Sanpete County, 
Utah. Plaintiff joined as defendants its seller, assignees of 
its seller, other parties claiming an interest in the property 
as well as all unknown persons claiming an interest in the 
property, and D Land Title Company who was the trustee of a 
trust deed encumbering plaintiff's property. Immediately prior 
to trial, plaintiff entered into a stipulation with defendants 
Pack and Action Title Company which stipulation was later 
reduced to writing and upon which the court entered a partial 
judgment quieting title in plaintiff. At the beginning of 
trial, plaintiff made a motion to amend its complaint to assert 
a claim against defendant Willard M. Tucker based on a 
promissory note. Defendant Tucker objected to the motion and 
the court denied the same. The court then dismissed the 
proceedings against defendants T.P. Family Partnership and 
Willard M. Tucker but specifically allowed plaintiff to pursue 
its claim against Willard M. Tucker on the note in a separate 
action. 
The trial then proceeded on plaintiff's claim against 
defendant D Land Title Company for negligence in failing to 
timely record the deed of reconveyance. The court found that 
plaintiff had not been damaged by defendant D Land Title 
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Company's delay* Plaintiff has brought this appeal from the 
court's partial judgment awarding defendant D Land Title 
Company judgment of no cause of action and from the court's 
denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment. 
Statement of Fact£ 
On May 18, 1977, plaintiff entered into a uniform real 
estate contract to purchase certain real property consisting 
approximately 10 acres of unimproved real estate in Sanpete 
County, State of Utah, from defendant Hoffbuher RedifMix, Inc. 
for the sum of the $12,000. (Exhibit 4.) Hoffbuher Redi->Mix, 
Inc. quitclaimed its interest in the subject property to 
defendant T.P. Family Partnership on November 12, 1980. 
(Exhibit 1.) On August 28, 1981, T.P. Family Partnership, 
Willard M. Tucker individually, and Phyllis 0. Tucker 
individually, executed a trust deed in favor of Margaret A. 
Gunterman, which trust deed secured a promissory note executed 
by said trustors to Margaret A. Gunterman in the amount of 
$21,000. (Exhibit 3.) The real property which is the subject 
matter of this action was only a part of the property securing 
said indebtedness to defendant Gunterman. (Exhibit 3.) 
Plaintiff's payments under the aforesaid uniform real 
estate contract with defendant Hoffbuher Redi^Mix, Inc. were 
paid in full. (Transcript p.32.) However, in order to obtain 
a deed of reconveyance from defendant Gunterman, plaintiff had 
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to pay an additional $4,000 to defendant Gunterman. 
(Transcript p.32.) Defendant Gunterman requested a deed of 
partial reconveyance on December 6, 1983, and defendant D Land 
Title Company, as trustee under said trust deed executed a deed 
of partial reconveyance on December 16, 1983. (Exhibit 5.) 
However, D Land Title Company failed to record said deed of 
reconveyance until May 29, 1984. (Exhibit 5.) The deed of 
reconveyance had been placed on the back of the refrigerator in 
the office of one of the officers of D Land Title Company and 
forgotten until Roberta Bushell, one of the partners of the 
plaintiff partnership, inquired with regard thereto. 
(Transcript p.43.) It is undisputed that the deed of 
reconveyance should have been recorded within 10 days after its 
receipt by defendant D Land Title Company. (Transcript p.25.) 
When the deed of reconveyance was located, it was immediately 
recorded. (Transcript p.44.) However, prior thereto, on April 
9, 1984, defendant Gunterman executed an assignment of trust 
deed, which assigned her interest in the aforesaid trust deed 
to defendant Daniel Pack, (Exhibit 2.) That assignment of 
trust deed was recorded May 1, 1984, prior to the recordation 
of the reconveyance from D Land Title Company, (Exhibit 2.) 
On June 4, 1984, defendant Action Title Company was 
substituted as trustee of said trust deed and prepared a notice 
of default which was recorded on July 26, 1984. (R. 3, 16.) 
Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to the subject 
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property in plaintiff and to prevent the loss of the property 
through the foreclosure action of Action Title Company on 
behalf of defendant Pack. This action was necessitated by 
defendant D Land Title Company's negligence in failing to 
record the reconveyance within a reasonable time. The court 
entered judgment quieting title in favor of plaintiff and 
plaintiff incurred damages in the amount of $2,300 represented 
by reasonable attorney's fees and court costs in the bringing 
this action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The first issue raised by plaintiff's appeal is whether or 
not the lower court erred in failing to find that plaintiff had 
been damaged by the delay of defendant D Land Title Company in 
recording the deed of partial release and partial reconveyance 
(Exhibit 5). The evidence is undisputed that defendant 
Gunterman executed said document on December 6, 1983, and that 
the same was received by defendant D Land Title Company and 
executed by defendant D Land Title Company on December 16, 
1983. It is also undisputed that the reason the document was 
not recorded was because it was merely forgotten. There is no 
question that defendant D Land Title Company owed a duty to 
plaintiff to execute and record the deed of reconveyance and 
that defendant D Land Title Company breached its duty to record 
said document. (Transcript p.25.) The only issues left to be 
determined are whether or not plaintiff has been damaged by 
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defendant D Land Title Company's breach and the amount of those 
damages. 
Defendant Pack was a good faith purchaser for valuable 
consideration of an interest in the subject real property and 
therefore the assignment to him of defendant Gunterman's 
beneficial interest in the subject trust deed is an encumbrance 
against plaintiff's title to the property. Had defendant D 
Land Title Company timely recorded the deed of reconveyance, 
plaintiff's title would be free and clear of encumbrances, 
including the interest of defendant Pack. Plaintiff was 
required to bring this action to protect its interest in the 
property from being foreclosed by defendant Pack, and therefore 
its reasonable attorney's fees in quieting title to the subject 
property are recoverable against defendant D Land Title 
Company. The undisputed testimony as to plaintiff's reasonable 
attorney's fees in quieting the title to the subject property 
is $2,300. Therefore, judgment should enter in favor of 
plaintiff and against defendant D Land Title Company in the 
amount of $2,300. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT DEFENDANT D LAND 
TITLE COMPANY OWED A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF TO RECORD 
THE DEED OF PARTIAL RELEASE AND PARTIAL RECONVEYANCE 
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER ITS RECEIPT THEREOF 
AND THAT DEFENDANT D LAND TITLE COMPANY BREACHED 
THAT DUTY TO PLAINTIFF. 
In this case, the operative facts are undisputed. The 
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controversy is centered on the effect of the recording statutes 
on the interests of plaintiff and defendant Pack in the subject 
property* A chronology of the pertinent events is as follows: 
1) Plaintiff purchased the subject real property by 
uniform real estate contact on May 18, 1977, from Hoffbuher 
Redit*Mix, Inc. 
2) Hoffbuher Redi4Mix, Inc. quitsclaimed its interest in 
the subject property to defendant T.P. Family Partnership on 
November 12, 1980. 
3) On August 28, 1981, T.P. Family Partnership executed a 
promissory note and a trust deed securing said note in favor of 
Margaret A. Gunterman in the amount of $21,000, which trust 
deed encumbered the subject property as well as other real 
estate. 
4) On December 6, 1983, defendant Gunterman executed a 
document entitled Deed of Partial Release and Partial 
Reconveyance (Exhibit 5). 
5) On December 16, 1983, the trustee, defendant D Land 
Title Company, received said deed of partial release and 
partial reconveyance and executed the deed of reconveyance on 
December 16, 1983. 
6) On April 9, 1984, defendant Gunterman executed an 
assignment of trust deed, which assigned her interest in the 
aforesaid trust deed to defendant Daniel Pack. 
7) On May 1, 1984, the assignment from defendant Gunterman 
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to defendant Pack was recorded. 
8) On May 29, 1984, the deed on reconveyance executed by 
defendant D Land Title Company was recorded. 
In addition to the foregoing facts, it is also undisputed 
that defendant D Land Title Company should have recorded said 
deed of reconveyance and that a reasonable in which to do so 
would have been 7 to 10 days according to the testimony of 
Merrill Ogden, an agent of defendant D Land Title Company. 
(Transcript p.25.) Douglas Neeley, an agent of defendant D 
Land Title Company at the time the deed of reconveyance was 
received by defendant D Land Title Company, described what 
happened to the document. He testified of its delivery to 
Jackson Wanlass, an agent of defendant D Land Title Company, as 
follows: 
Q: Then what you are saying is that the document was left 
with Jackson Wanlass and Jackson Wanlass was instructed to 
record. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you're saying that Jackson Wanlass did not record. 
A: Right. 
Q: Now do you know why he didn't record. 
A: Yah. It was just forgotten and the only reason it was 
remembered is when Mrs. Bushell came back down she asked why it 
hadn't been, and that's when we went through the documents 
sitting on the back of the fridge to see where it was. 
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Q: And then you found the document then. 
A: Yes, And recorded it then, that very day. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that defendant D Land 
Title Company breached its duty to record the deed of 
reconveyance within a reasonable time. The questions remaining 
to be determined on appeal then are whether or not plaintiff 
has been damaged by defendant D Land Title Company's breach, 
and the amount of those damages. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT PACKfS INTEREST AS ASSIGNEE OF THE BENEFICIAL 
INTEREST OF DEFENDANT GUNTERMAN CONSTITUTED AN ENCUMBRANCE 
AGAINST THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND WAS NOT EFFECTED BY 
THE DEED OF RECONVEYANCE LATER RECORDED BY 
DEFENDANT D LAND TITLE COMPANY. 
The lower court granted judgment of no cause of action in 
favor of defendant D Land Title Company on the basis that the 
deed of partial release and reconveyance gave plaintiff 
unencumbered title and that the assignment from defendant 
Gunterman to defendant Pack did not have any effect on 
plaintiff's legal title. However, the lower court erred in so 
ruling. Utah Code Anno. §57n3#3 reads as follows: 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which 
shall not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be 
void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or 
any portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be 
first duly recorded. 
Consequently, inasmuch as the assignment to defendant Pack 
was recorded prior to the reconveyance executed by defendant D 
Land Title Company, the assignment to defendant Pack would have 
9 
priority over the reconveyance if the following conditions are 
met: 
1. The reconveyance is considered a conveyance of real 
estate. 
2. Defendant Pack was a subsequent purchaser in good 
faith and for valuable consideration. 
3. The assignment to defendant Pack was a "conveyance". 
Utah Code Anno. §57<B1#1 defines conveyance as follows: 
The term "conveyance" as used in this title shall be 
construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which 
any real estate, or interest in real estate, is created, 
aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills, 
and leases for a term not exceeding one year. 
Utah Code Anno. §57*1*19(3) provides that: 
"Trust Deed" means a deed executed in conformity with this 
act and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to 
secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor or 
other person named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
Utah Code Anno. §57#ls33 provides that: 
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has been 
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the 
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The 
reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as "the 
person or person entitled thereto". 
The deed of partial release and reconveyance executed by D 
Land Title Company was made in favor of plaintiff as the person 
entitled to the release and reconveyance. Based on the 
foregoing statutes, and the term "reconveyance" itself, it can 
hardly be disputed that the deed of partial release and 
reconveyance executed by defendant D Land Title Company was a 
conveyance of real estate as referred to in §57*343. 
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defendant D Land Title Company's breach and the amount of those 
damages. 
Defendant Pack was a good faith purchaser for valuable 
consideration of an interest in the subject real property and 
therefore the assignment to him of defendant Gunterman's 
beneficial interestack nor defendant 
Gunterman were present at trial and there was no testimony as 
to the amount paid for the assignment. No evidence was offered 
to the effect that defendant Pack was not a good faith 
purchaser for value. In 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser §371 it 
states: 
While it has been held that the good faith of purchasers 
of land fraudulently transferred to the grantor cannot be 
presumed, a purchaser for value under a recorded deed is, 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed prima 
facie to be an innocent purchaser in good faith as against 
one claimant under a prior unrecorded deed; and where 
nothing is alleged to the contrary, it has been held that 
it must be assumed that the purchaser is a bona fide 
purchaser for valuable consideration. Where a subsequent 
purchaser first records his deed, it has been held that 
there is a presumption that he acquired his title in good 
faith and without notice of the prior unrecorded 
conveyance. 
In Archuleta v. Anders, 67 N.M. 422, 356 P.2d 443 (1960), 
the court stated: 
The rule is so well established as to need no citation of 
authority, that there is presumption that consideration 
was paid and that the purchaser acted in good faith. 
Accordingly, since there is no allegation that the 
assignment was made fraudulently and since there was no 
evidence to indicate that the assignment Was made in good faith 
and for valuable consideration, defendant Pack must be presumed 
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to have been a good faith purchaser for valuable consideration. 
The next question is whether or not the assignment from 
defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack was also a conveyance 
within the meaning of Utah Code Anno. §57*3*3. Utah Code Anno. 
§57#1^1 specifically provides that a mortgage is a conveyance 
within the meaning of that statute. Utah Code Anno. §57«*1?*14 
provides in part that a 
mortgage when executed as required by law shall have the 
effect of the conveyance of the land therein described, 
together with all the rights, privledges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns 
and legal representatives, as security for the payment of 
the indebtedness thereon set forth, .... 
That section provides that a mortgage operates as a 
conveyance in favor of the mortgagee and his assignees. In 
Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 24 Utah2d 288, 470 P.2d 390, 
1970, the court equated a trust deed with a mortgage, as did 
the court in Belnap v. Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978). In the 
latter case the property was encumbered by three trust deeds 
and three judgment liens. The issue presented was whether or 
not the judgment lien of the plaintiff attached to the 
defendants1 fee interest in the property inasmuch as the value 
of the property did not exceed the prior liens of the trust 
deeds and judgments. The defendant judgment debtor argued that 
inasmuch as there was no equity in the property, the 
plaintiff's judgment lien did not attach. The court rejected 
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defendant's argument and stated as follows: 
The reference to the judgment debtor's interest means his 
estate in the real property; herein identified as a fee 
simple. Crowley's estate was in no way diminished or 
modified by the encumberances, which consitituted mere 
liens or charges against the property. A mortgagee's 
interest is no longer an estate, but a mere lien, 
incapable of being separated from the debt and transferred 
by itself. The mortgagee has no power to recover 
possession of the land, his interest is a mere equitable 
lien and not an estate. Equity enforces the lien by the 
sale of the premises and application of the proceeds upon 
the debt. 
575 P.2d at 698. 
Thus, a trust deed is treated as a lien as is a mortgage. 
In the present case, it was defendant D Land Title Company's 
position that the interest of the beneficiary under a trust 
deed is not an encumberance. Defendant argued that the trustee 
under the trust deed held legal title and that subsequent 
conveyances of the beneficial interest in no way affected the 
real property. However, in Belnap v. Blain, supra, the court 
held that the beneficial interest under a trust deed is 
equivalent to the mortgagee's interest under a mortgage and 
that the same constitutes a lien against the real property. 
Utah Code Anno. §57^1*14 provides that the assignment of the 
mortgagee's interest constitutes a conveyance and Utah Code 
Anno. §57*1*36 provides that the assignment of the beneficial 
interest under a trust deed may be recorded. 
It should be further noted that the assignee of a mortgage 
or trust deed is the proper person to enter the satisfaction of 
mortgage or request the reconveyance of the property. The 
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assignee's rights are not affected by some third^party's 
release or reconveyance. In 59 C.J.S Mortgages §374 it states: 
The assignee of a mortgage as absolute owner is the proper 
person to enter of record the satisfaction of the mortgage 
or to give a release thereof. After the assignment the 
mortgagee, in the absence of authority conferred by the 
assignee, has no power to release or satisfy the mortgage 
and the release or satisfaction piece given by the 
mortgagee after he has assigned the mortgage is in fraud 
of the assignee's rights. 
Likewise, in 89 ALR 190, it states: 
The recording of the assignment operates as notice to all 
of the assignee's rights as against any subsequent acts of 
the mortgagee affecting the mortgage. Thus, it protects 
them against a subsequent assignment of the mortgage. 
It also protects him against a subsequent and unauthorized 
discharge and release of the mortgage by the mortgagee. 
In W. W. Planning, Inc. v. Clark, 10 Ariz.App. 86, 456 
P.2d 406 (1969), the seller of real property reserved the right 
to receive a reconveyance free from encumberances from the 
purchaser, unless construction began within 18 months of the 
sale. The purchaser then executed a note secured by a mortgage 
against the real property which was assigned by the mortgagee. 
The assignment of the mortgage was recorded prior to the 
recordation of the contract between the seller and purchaser. 
The court held that the assignee of the mortgage was a 
subsequent purchaser within the meaning of the Arizona 
recording statute and that the assignee of the mortgage had 
priority over the seller's interest. The Arizona recording 
statute is similar to Utah Code Anno. §57*3*3 and provides in 
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part: 
No instrument affecting real property is valid against 
subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without 
notice, unless recorded as provided by law in the office 
of the county recorder of the county in which the property 
is located. A.R.S. §334411 
From the foregoing cited authority, it is evident that the 
reconveyance of the subject trust deed did not affect defendant 
Pack's lien against the property and that plaintiff's interest 
in the property was subject to the encumberance in favor of 
defendant Pack. That conclusion is reached not only by the 
operative facts falling clearing within the language of Utah 
Code Anno. §57^3^3, but also upon consideration of the policy 
behind the recording statute. At the time defendant Pack 
purchased the interest of defendant Gunterman, the county 
records reflected that the property was subject to a trust deed 
in favor of defendant Gunterman in the amount of $21,000. 
Defendant Pack would have been entitled to rely upon what the 
record disclosed regarding the security for the note purchased 
by defendant Pack. It would be patently unfair for defendant 
Pack to be deprived of his security interest in plaintiff's 
property by a later recorded deed of partial reconveyance. 
Consequently, at the time plaintiff initiated this action, its 
title to the subject property was subject to the lien of 
15 
defendant Pack. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES FOR DEFENDANT D LAND TITLE COMPANYfS 
NEGLIGENCE IN FAILING TO TIMELY RECORD THE DEED OF 
RECONVEYANCE ARE PROPERLY MEASURED BY PLAINTIFF'S COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN PROSECUTING AN ACTION FOR 
QUIET TITLE AGAINST DEFENDANTS PACK AND ACTION TITLE COMPANY. 
Having determined that plaintiff's title was subject to 
the interest of defendant Pack# the next issue is the measure 
of plaintiff's damages. Inasmuch as plaintiff has settled the 
matter with defendant Pack and the court has quieted title to 
the property in plaintiff, plaintiff's out of pocket loss is 
related solely to its costs of bringing this action to quiet 
title to the subject property. 
Although attorney's fees are not generally recoverable in 
an action in chief, absent a contract or statute so providing, 
attorney's fees are a proper element of damage in a collateral 
proceeding. 
Where the natural and proximate consequence of a wrongful 
act has been to involve plaintiff in litigation with 
others, there may, as a general rule, be recovery and 
damages against the author of such act of the reasonable 
expenses incurred in such litigation, including 
compensation for attorney's fees and such costs as may 
have been awarded against plaintiff. As similarly stated, 
where a person through the tort of another has been 
required to act in protection of his interest by bringing 
or defending an action against a third person, he is 
entitled to recover from the wrongdoer attorney fees and 
other expenses incurred in the prior litigation, or where 
the breach of the contract has forced one of the 
contracting parties to maintain or defend an action 
against a third party, he is entitled to recover from the 
party breaching the contract attorney's fees and other 
expenses incurred in the prior litigation. 
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25 CJS Damages §50e. 
In Gray v. Don Miller and Associates, Inc., 674 P.2d 253 
(Cal. 1984), the court awarded plaintiff damages in the amount 
of the attorneyfs fees incurrred for the "tort of another". 
The court noted that an exception to the general rule that each 
party is to bear his own attorney's fees in the absence of a 
statute or contract, is sometimes referred to as the "tort of 
another" or "third party tort", which 
allows the plaintiff attorney fees if he is required to 
employ counsel to prosecute or defend an action against a 
third party because of the tort of the defendant. This 
rule is embodied in the Restatement of Torts and is 
generally followed in the United States (Rest.2d Torts, 
§914, subd.(2) adppen.).... The next question is whether 
plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney fees on the 
basis "of the 'tort' of another" exception to the general 
rule because he was required to protect his interest by 
bringing an action against the sellers as a result of 
Fitch's wrongdoing. We can see no escape from the 
validity of plaintiff's claim in "this regard. If Fitch 
had no first falsely notified plaintiff that his offer had 
been accepted and several months later told him that the 
sellers declined to sell the property, plaintiff would not 
have incurred attorney fees in seeking to obtain the 
property in a suit for specific performance against the 
sellers. Thus, Fitch's misrepresentation is the direct 
cause of plaintiff's action for specific performance 
against the sellers. 
674 P.2d at 257, 258. Restatement 2d Torts, §914(2), provides: 
One who through the tort of another has been required to 
act in the protection of his interest by bringing or 
defending an action against a third person is entitled to 
recover reasonable compensation for loss of time, 
attorney's fees and other expenditures thereby suffered or 
incurred in the earlier action. 
In the present case, plaintiff was ehtitled to protect its 
interest in the property by bringing this action to quiet title 
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in the property and forestalling the foreclosure proceedings 
initiated by Action Title Company, the substituted trustee 
under the subject trust deed. Plaintiff's action to quiet 
title resulted from the negligence of defendant D Land Title 
Company in not timely recording the deed of partial release and 
partial reconveyance. But for the negligence of defendant D 
Land Title Company, plaintiff's action against defendants Pack 
and Action Title Company would not have been necessary. 
Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs and 
attorney's fees in pursuing the quiet title action against 
defendants Pack and Action Title Company. 
The court did not make any finding as to plaintiff's 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees in quieting title to the 
subject property because the court ruled that plaintiff had not 
been damaged by defendant D Land Title Company's failure to 
timely record the deed of partial release and partial 
reconveyance. That ruling, however, was made upon the 
erroneous assumption that the assignment of the beneficial 
interest in the trust deed to defendant Pack and the prior 
recordation thereof, did not constitute an encumbrance against 
the property. Plaintiff's evidence of costs and attorney's 
fees consisted of testimony of plaintiff's counsel to the 
effect that a reasonable attorney's fee in this matter is 
$2,300. In response to the court's inquiry: "What do you 
claim a reasonable Attorneys fees that you're asking for, for 
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damages. That's what I'm really interested in," plaintiff's 
counsel replied: "$2,300". (Transcript p.37.) On 
cross-examination, defendant D Land Title Company's counsel 
inquired as to whether or not separate charges were made 
against Mrs. Gunterman. Plaintiff's counsel replied, "No, 
sir." (Transcript pp.394440.) However, the court's inquiry was 
as to the amount claimed for damages against defendant D Land 
Title Company. That amount was testified to be $2,300. There 
is no evidence that that amount also included the prosecution 
of claims against the other defendants. The court specifically 
stated that he did not care what plaintiff's had been charged, 
he wanted to know what a reasonable attorney's fee was for 
damages. That amount is $2,300 and is uncontested. Therefore, 
judgment should be entered against defendant D Land Title 
Company in the amount of $2,300. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the undisputed evidence presented at trial, the 
lower court misapplied the law to the facts of this case in 
finding that plaintiff had not been damaged by defendant D Land 
Title Company's delay in recording the deed of partial release 
and partial reconveyance. The recordation of defendant Pack's 
assignment of the beneficial interest in the subject trust deed 
was not affected by the later recordation of the deed of 
partial release and partial reconveyance and plaintiff's 
interest in the subject property was subject to said 
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assignment* Plaintiff's action to quiet title to the subject 
property was necessary to protect its interest in the property 
and plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and 
costs against defendant D Land Title Company for its negligence 
in failing to timely record said deed of partial release and 
partial reconveyance* The amount of said reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs is $2,300. Therefore, the court should reverse 
the judgment of the lower court and enter judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and against defendant D Land Title Company in the sum 
of $2,300. 
Dated: , 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRENT D. YOUNG // 
I hereby certify that on this <^2 / day of July, 1986, I 
caused to be mailed four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing brief to the following: 
Tex R. Olson 
Attorney at Law 
76 South Main 
P.O. Box 100 
Richfield, UT 84701 
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A P P E N D I X 
57-1-1 REAL ESTATE 
57-1-27. Sale of t rust property by trustee—Public auction—Conduct by at-
torney for trustee—Trustor may direct order in which trust prop-
erty sold—Bids—Postponement of sale. 
57-1-28. Sale of t rust property by ttrustee—Payment of bid—Trustee's deed de-
livered to purchaser—Rejcitals—Effect. 
57-1-29. Proceeds of t rus teed sale—Disposition. 
57-1-30. Sale of t rust property by trustee—Corporate stock evidencing water 
rights given to secure t rust deed. 
57-1-31. Trust deeds—Default in performance of obligations secured—Rein-
statement—Cancellation of recorded notice of default. 
57-1-32. Sale of t rus t property by trustee—Action to recover balance due upon 
obligation for which tr^ist deed was given as security. 
57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by trust deed—Reconveyance of 
trust property. 
57-1-34. Sale of t rust property by trustee—Foreclosure of t rust deed—Limita-
tion of actions. 
57-1-35. Trust deeds—Transfer of debts secured by—Transfer of security. 
57-1-36. Trust deeds—Instruments entitled to be recorded—Assignment of a 
beneficial interest. 
57-1-1. "Conveyance" defined.—The term "conveyance" as used in this 
title shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which 
any real estate, or interest in real estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged, 
encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases for a term not exceeding 
one year. 
History: B. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1969; 
C. I* 1917, §4869; E. S. 1933 ft C. 1943, 
78-1-1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statute, 2 Comp. Laws 
1888, § 2645. 
Cross-Eeferences. 
Insane wife, relinquishment of statutory 
interest by, 75-13-22. 
Married woman, property r ights , 30-2-1 
et seq. 
"Real property" defined, 68-3-12. 
Statute of frauds generally, 25-5-1 et seq. 
Wife's interest in real estate of husband, 
74-1-1, 74-4-3. 
Construction of deed. 
A deed should be construed so as to 
effectuate the intentions and desires of the 
parties as manisfested by the language in 
the deed. Wood v. Ashby, 122 U. 580, 
253 P . 2d 351. 
Contract for sale. 
Where contract for sale of property pro-
vided that seller was to furnish good and 
marketable tit le and further provided that 
if buyer defaulted the seller could keep 
the earnest money as liquidated damages, 
and before time for performance buyer 
repudiated the contract claiming tha t sell-
er did not furnish marketable t i t le and 
buyer did not allow seller a reasonable 
time within which to perfect t i t le ; held 
that buyer could not recover the down 
payment. Walker v. C. C. Bintz & Shaw, 
Inc., 3 U. (2d) 162, 280 P . 2d 767. 
"Conveyance." 
Under broad definition of term "convey-
ance" in this section, interest in real prop-
erty may be conveyed without use of deed. 
Stucki v. Ellis, 114 U. 486, 201 P . 2d 486. 
Written instrument signed by equitable 
owner of premises under contract, reciting 
tha t certain sum had been received from 
purchaser as deposit on purchase of prem-
ises and specifying purchase price and 
terms, when considered in connection with 
full payment by purchaser to both equita-
ble and legal owners together with war-
ranty deed executed by lat ter , constituted 
"conveyance" within meaning of this sec-
tion. Stucki v. EUis, 114 U. 486, 201 P. 
2d 486. 
"Convey and warrant." 
Words "convey and warrant" suffice to 
pass an estate in lands. Haynes v. Hunt, 
96 U. 348, 85 P . 2d 861. 
Delivery of deed. 
Where decedent intended that deed and 
bill of sale pass property upon his death, 
deed was testamentary in character and 
intent and was inoperative since it did not 
conform to statutory requirements for 
testamentary disposition. Firs t Security 
Bank v. Burgi, 122 U. 445, 251 P . 2d 297, 
distinguished in 6 U. (2d) 98, 306 P. 2d 
773. 
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57-1-14 REAL ESTATE 
soever to indicate a claim of ownership in citals, and other a t tendant facts, having 
the property, or to protect it , tha t ho in mind the rule tha t generally the instru-
stood by and let the taxes go delinquent, ment is construed in favor of the grantee. 
and that he permitted the grantor to pur- Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 123 U. 123, 255 
chase the outstanding tax t i t le , and to P . 2d 989. 
continue to pay the taxes for 32 years. 
can most reasonably be interpreted as Collateral Eeferences. 
indicating tha t the grantor did not actu- Deed8^=*29. 
ally convey to the grantee, and that the 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 22. 
deed was for some other purpose. North- Formal requisites, 23 Am. Jur . 2d 99 et 
crest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., seq., Deeds § 32 et seq. 
122 U. 268, 248 P . 2d 692. 
Our statute requires no word of ar t to Eights or interests covered by quitclaim 
quitclaim. In construing whether an in- deed, 44 A. L. E . 1266, 162 A. L. E. 556. 
strument passes ti t le, each case stands on Test of conveyance as quitclaim or 
i ts own words, combinations thereof, re- otherwise, 3 A. L. E. 945. 
57-1-14. Form of mortgage—Effect.—A mortgage of land may be sub-
stantially in the following form: 
MORTGAGE 
(here insert name), mortgagor, of (insert place of 
residence), hereby mortgages to (insert name), mortgagee, of 
(insert place of residence), for the sum of dollars, the 
following described tract of land in . County, Utah, 
to wit: (here describe the premises). 
This mortgage is given to secure the following indebtedness (here 
state amount and form of indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and 
to whom payable and where). 
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on said prem-
ises, and the sum of dollars attorneys' fee in case of foreclosure. 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this day of , 
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Such mortgage when executed as required by law shall have the effect 
of a conveyance of the land therein described, together with all the rights, 
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the mortgagee, his 
heirs, assigns and legal representatives, as security for the payment of the 
indebtedness thereon set forth, with covenants from the mortgagor of 
general warranty of title, and that all taxes and assessments levied and 
assessed upon the land described, during the continuance of the mortgage, 
will be paid previous to the day appointed for the sale of such lands for 
taxes; and may be foreclosed as provided by law upon any default being 
made in any of the conditions thereof as to payment of either principal, 
interest, taxes or assessments. 
History: K. S. 1898 ft C. L. 1907, § 1983; Purchase-money mortgage on homestead 
O. I* 1917, § 4883; B. 8. 1933 ft O. 1943, not exempt, 28-1-1. 
78-1-13. Eecording assignment of mortgage, 57-
Cross-Eeferences. 
Failure to discharge mortgage after sat- Conveyance. 
isfaction, 57-3-8. Term "conveyance," as used in this sec-
Foreclosure of mortgages, 78-37-1 et seq. tion, eovers transactions merely involving 
Mortgage not deemed a conveyance, 78- effective mortgage or encumbrance of land 
40-8. and not transfer of t i t le or estate in view 
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57-1-17 REAL ESTATE 
forth that he has not, or had not at the time of doing any act pursuant 
to the power of attorney, received actual knowledge or actual notice of 
the revocation or termination of the power of attorney, by death or other-
wise, or notice of any facts indicating the same, shall, in the absence of 
fraud, be conclusive proof of the no^revocation or nontermination of the 
power at such time. If the exercise of the power requires execution and 
delivery of any instrument which is recordable under the laws of this 
state, such affidavit (when authenticated for record in the manner pre-
scribed by law) shall likewise be recordable. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 82, § 2; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Snpp., 78-1-15. Principal and Agent<S=>43(l). 
2 C.J.S. Agency § 86. 
57-1-17. Report of "missing"—Effect of as notice.—No report or list-
ing, either official or otherwise, of "missing" or "missing in action," as 
such words are used in military paijlance, shall constitute or be inter-
preted as constituting actual knowledge or actual notice of the death of 
such principal or notice of any facts indicating the same, nor shall it 
operate to revoke the agency. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 82, § 3; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Snpp., 78-1-16. Principal and Agent<S=»43(l). 
2 C.J.8. Agency § 135. 
57-1-18. Effect of provisions in po^er.—This act shall not be construed 
so as to alter or affect any provision for revocation or termination con-
tained in such power of attorney. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 82, § 4; C. 1943, Repealing Clause. 
Supp., 78-1-17. Section 6 of Laws 1945, ch. 82 provided: 
K.ll acts or parts of acts in conflict here-th are hereby repealed." 
Section 5 of Laws 1945, ch. 82 provided: 
"If any provision of this act or the appli- Effective Date. 
cation thereof to any person or circum- 8ection 7 of Laws 1945, ch. 82 provided 
stance be held invalid, snch invalidity that act should take effect on approval, 
shall not affect any other provision or Approved March 5, 1945. 
application of the act which can be given 
effect without the invalid provision or Collateral References, 
application, and to this end the provisions Principal and Agent£=»43(l). 
of this act are declared to be severable." 2 C.J.S. Agency § 135. 
57-1-19. Trust deeds—Definitions of terms.—As used in this act: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in 
a trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his 
successor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust 
deed as security for the performance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with this act 
and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the perform-
ance of an obligation of the grantor or other person named in the deed 
to a beneficiary. 
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CONVEYANCES 57-1-21 
i£) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is con-
f, ^ v trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
%™ *z\ "Real property" means any estate or interest in land, including all 
IL»n4inffS fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights 
2 r v easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, 
*** .. *
 s a n d appurtenances thereunto belonging, used or enjoyed with 
E d land, or any part thereof. 
i (B) "Trust property" means the re^l property conveyed by the trust 
Js. 1961, ch. 181, § 1. obligations of parties to trust deeds, and 
wm**r. repealing section 78-37-7, Utah Code An-
M 0 » of Act notated 1953. 
E-7I ^ t relating to trust deeds; authoriz-
C f \ £ f e n in trust of real property Collateral References. 
sZatinff trustees of trust deeds a power Mortgages<§»l. 
E^Lle providing the manner in which the 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 5. 
I " **jL Qf gale shall be exercised and the Deeds of trust, 55 Am. Jur. 2d 204 et 
held providing for the rights and seq., Mortgages § 15 et seq. 
•BT-1-20* Transfers in trust of real property—Purposes—Effect.—Trans-
in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of 
obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed 
s beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust 
BTty acquired by the trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent 
•..the execution of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security 
the obligation or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed 
i like manner as if acquired before execution of the trust deed. 
I* 1961, cb, 181, § 2. Collateral References, 
Mortgages3=>l. 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 6. 
^7-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds—Qualifications.—(1) The trustee of 
deed shall be: 
(a) Any member of the Utah state b&i, 
(b) Any bank, building and loan association, sayings and loan associa-
or insurance company authorized to do business in Utah under the 
\ of Utah or the United States, 
(e) Any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business in Utah 
* the laws of Utah or the United States, 
(d) Any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do business 
Jtah under the laws of Utah, or 
f e) Any agency of the United States government. 
arises (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of tnis subsection shall not be appli-
to a trustee of a trust deed existing prior to the effective date of this 
riior to any indenture supplemental thereto. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed shall not be the beneficiary therein, 
\ the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under clause (b), (c) or (e) 
ection (1) of this section. 
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57-1-34 REAL ESTATE 
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee—Foreclosure of trust deed 
Limitation of actions.—The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed 
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for 
the foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be commenced, within 
the period prescribed by law for the commencement of an action on the 
obligation secured by the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 16. Collateral References. 
Mortgages<&=:>345. 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 558. 
57-1-35. Trust deeds—Transfer of debts secured by—Transfer of seen-
rity.—The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as 
a transfer of the security therefor. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 17. Collateral References. 
Mortgages<§=>219. 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 344. 
57-1-36. Trust deeds—Instruments entitled to be recorded—Assign-
ment of a beneficial interest.—Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, as-
signment of a beneficial interest under a trust deed, notice of default, 
trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust property and any instrument by 
which any trust deed is subordinated or waived as to priority, when ac-
knowledged as provided by law, shall be entitled to be recorded, and 
shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record, im-
part notice of the contents thereof to all persons, including subsequent 
purchasers and encumbrancers for value, except that the recording of an 
assignment of a beneficial interest in the trust deed shall not in itself 
be deemed notice of such assignment to the trustor, his heirs or personal 
representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by them, or any 
of them, to the person holding the note, bond or other instrument evidenc-
ing the obligation by the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, §18. Cross-Reference. 
Recorder's fees, 21-2-3. 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 19 of Laws 1961, ch. 181 pro- Collateral References. 
vided: "Section 78-37-7, Utah Code An- Mortgages<S=>91. 
notated 1953, is hereby repealed." 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 203. 
C H A P T E E 2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Manner of acknowledging or proving conveyances. 
Who authorized to take acknowledgments. 
Acknowledgment by deputy. 
Taking acknowledgments of persons with United States armed forces. 
Certificate of acknowledgment. 
Pa r ty must be known or identified. 
Form of certificate of acknowledgment. 
When grantor unknown to officer. 
When executed by at torney in fact. 
Proof of execution—How made. 
Witness must be known or identified. 
Section 57-2-1. 
57-2-2. 
57-2-3. 
57-2-4. 
57-2-5. 
57-2-6. 
57-2-7. 
57-2-8. 
57-2-9. 
57-2-10. 
57-2-11. 
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57-3-3 REAL ESTATE 
Omission of amount of debt in mortgage 
or in record thereof (including general 
description without stating amount) as 
affecting validity of mortgage, its opera-
tion as notice, or its coverage with respect 
to debts secured, 145 A. L. E. 369. 
Eecord as charging one with construc-
tive notice of provisions of extrinsic in-
strument referred to in the recorded in-
strument, 82 A. L. E. 412. 
Eecord of deed or contract for convey-
ance of one parcel with covenant or ease-
ment affecting another parcel owned by 
grantor as constructive notice to subse-
quent purchaser or encumbrancer of latter 
parcel, 16 A. L. E. 1013. 
History: R. S. 189S * C. L. 1907, § 2001; 
C. L. 1917, §4901; B. S. 1933 * C. 1943, 
78-3-3. 
Effect of failure to record. 
Where, after mortgage was executed on 
certain tract of land, owner executed 
deed to grantee on property not included 
in mortgage, which deed was not recorded, 
decree in action to foreclose mortgage on 
tract of land, including part conveyed to 
grantee, was not binding on grantee who 
was not party to such action. Federal 
Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 U. 156, 
48 P. 2d 480, 102 A. L. E. 819. 
A judgment lien is subordinate and in-
ferior to a deed which predated it whether 
recorded after such judgment or whether 
not recorded at all. Kartchner v. State 
Tax Comm., 4 U. (2d) 382, 294 P. 2d 790. 
Priority. 
Innocent purchaser for value without 
notice of previous conveyance, who first 
records his conveyance, takes preference 
over prior unrecorded conveyance. Mc-
Garry v. Thompson, 114 U. 442, 201 P. 2d 
288, involving priority as between assign-
ments of application to appropriate un-
appropriated public water under 73-3-18, 
citing Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Smith, 2 U. 
39, affd. 104 U. S. 428, 26 L. Ed. 802. 
Later in time but prior recorded first 
mortgage took precedence over purchase 
money mortgage where mortgagee had 
no notice of the purchase money mortgage. 
Kemp v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 24 U. 
(2d) 288, 470 P. 2d 390. 
Eecord of deed to cotenant as notice to 
other eotenants of adverse character of 
grantee's possession, 82 A. L. E. 2d 5. 
Eecord of instrument which comprises 
or includes an interest or right that is not 
a proper subject of record, 3 A. L. E. 2d 
577. 
Eecord of instrument without acknowl-
edgment or insufficiently acknowledged as 
notice, 59 A. L. E. 2d 1299. 
Eights as between purchaser of timber 
under unrecorded instrument and subse-
quent vendee of land, 18 A. L. E. 2d 1162. 
Words and phrases defined. 
This section does not define what is 
meant by the word "recorded." Boyer v. 
Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Co., 76 
U. 1, 287 P. 188. 
Mortgage lien is included in term "con-
veyance" as used in this section, mort-
gagee is purchaser, and law of priority of 
record applies to mortgages. Federal Land 
Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 U. 156, 48 
P. 2d 480,102 A. L. E. 819. 
Collateral References. 
Vendor and Purchaser<S»233. 
92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 345. 
Failure to record, 66 Am. Jur. 2d 437 et 
seq., Eecords and Recording Laws § 156 
et seq. 
Agreement between real estate owners 
restricting use of property as within con-
templation of recording laws, 4 A. L. E. 
2d 1419. 
Presumption and burden of proof as 
regards good faith and consideration on 
art of purchaser or one taking encum-
rance subsequent to unrecorded convey-
ance or encumbrance, 107 A. L. E. 502. 
Purchase-money mortgage as within pro-
vision of statute defeating or postponing 
lien of unrecorded or unfiled mortgage, 
137 A. L. E. 571, 168 A. L. B. 1164. 
Bight of one otherwise protected by re-
cording law against prior unrecorded deed 
or mortgage as affected by fact that all 
or part of the consideration was unpaid 
at the time he received notice, actual or 
constructive, of the prior instrument, 109 
4 . L. B. 163. 
57-3-3. Effect of failure to record.—Every conveyance of real estate 
hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as provided in this title, 
shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for 
a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof, 
where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
s;-
SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DANIEL PACK; MARGARET A. 
GUNTERMAN; ACTION TITLE COMPANY,) 
TRUSTEE; T. P. FAMILY PARTNER-
SHIP; HOFFBUHER REDI-MIX INC.; 
WILLARD M. TUCKER; PHYLLIS 0. 
TUCKER; D LAND TITLE COMPANY; 
and all unknown persons who 
have or claim any right, title 
estate, lien or interest in 
the subject property, 
Defendants, 
) 
D LAND TITLE COMPANY, 
JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
AND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 
D LAND TITLE COMPANY; 
ORDER DISMISSING 
C|ROSS-COMPLAINT. 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NORMA S. WANLASS, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 8978 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came oh regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, sitting at Manti, 
Sanpete County, State of Utah, on Monday, the 10th day of February, 
1986. The Plaintiff appeared through its attorneys, Brent D. Young 
and Jerry L. Reynolds of Ivie & Young, 48 North University Avenue, 
P.O. Box 672, Provo, Utah and the Defendant, T.P. Family Partnership 
- /OF -
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appeared through its attorney, Phillip L. Foremaster, and Defendant 
Willard M. Tucker appeared in person and with his attorney, Phillip 
L. Foremaster, and Defendant Daniel Pack having appeared through his 
attorney, Mark F. Robinson, and Plaintiff and the parties Defendant, 
with the exception of D Land Title having settled their claims by 
stipulation and D Land Title and Cross-Defendant Norma Wanlass 
having stipulated that any issues remaining upon the the crossclaim 
be reserved for further proceedings and the Court having heard the 
sworn testimony offered in support of Plaintiff!s claim against D 
Land Title and having examined documentary evidence and the Court 
having heard arguments of counsel and having made its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
IT IS NOW ORDERED: 
1. Defendant D Land Title is granted a judgment of no 
cause of action and its costs on Plaintiff fs claim for damages 
against D Land Title. 
2. Since no issues remain again$t Cross-Defendant Norma 
Wanlass, the pending Cross-Complaint is hereby dismissed. 
DATED this / Y day ofJEsk^^a^y-^386. 
<•• - •-'• i -' - ^ - V \ \ \ > ^ 
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TEX R. OLSEN NO. 2467 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
ATTORNEYS F™ DEFENDANT D LAND TITLE 
76 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
TELEPHONE: 896-4461 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
-vs-
DANIEL PACK; MARGARET A. 
GUNTERMAN; ACTION TITLE COMPANY, 
TRUSTEE; T. P. FAMILY PARTNER-
SHIP; HOFFBUHER REDI-MIX INC.; 
WILLARD M. TUCKER; PHYLLIS 0. 
TUCKER; D LAND TITLE COMPANY; 
and all unknown persons who 
have or claim any right, title 
estate, lien or interest in 
the subject property, 
Defendants, 
D LAND TITLE COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NORMA S. WANLASS, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION! 
OF LAW ON CLAIM AGAINST 
D LAND TITLE 
Civil No. 8978 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, sitting at 
- no -
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Manti, Sanpete County, State of Utah, on Monday, the 10th day o 
February, 1986• The Plaintiff appeared through its attorneys 
Brent D. Young and Jerry L. Reynolds of Ivie & Young, 48 Nort 
University Avenue, P.O. Box 672, PrOvo, Utah and the Defendant 
T.P. Family Partnership appeared through its attorney, Phillip L 
Foremaster, and Defendant Willard H. Tucker appeared in perso 
and with his attorney, Phillip L< Foremaster, and Defendan 
Daniel Pack having appeared through his attorney, Mark F 
Robinson, and Plaintiff and the parties Defendant, with th< 
exception of D Land Title having settled their claims b; 
stipulation and D Land Title and Cross-Defendant Norma Wanlas, 
having stipulated that any issues remaining upon the crossclaii 
be reserved for further proceedings and the Court having hear< 
the sworn testimony and having examined exhibits offered ii 
support of Plaintiff's claim against D Land Title and havinj 
introduced documentary evidence atxd the Court having hear< 
arguments of counsel and being fully advised, now makes th< 
following: 
FINDINGS OF tfACT 
1. D Land Title Company, 4 regularly-appointed Trustee 
and record owner of real property by reason of a Trust Deec 
executed by T, P. Family Partnership and recorded August 31, 1981 
in Book 228 on Pages 534 and 535 of the records of Sanpete 
County, State of Utah, which Trust Deed included title tc 
property located in Sanpete County, State of Utah, described as 
follows: 
- 3 -
The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter 
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 12 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, 
2. Plaintiff acquired an interest in and to th 
property specifically described in Paragraph 1 above and include 
in the described Trust Deed; Margaret A, Gunterman, a Beneficiar 
under the terms of the Trust Deed described in Paragraph 1 above 
specifically executed a Partial Release and Request fo 
Reconveyance of the property described in Finding No, 1. Th< 
Deed of Partial Release and Partial Reconveyance was executed b; 
D Land Title on or about the 16th day of December, 1983, an< 
thereafter recorded on the 29th day of May, 1984 in Book 253 
Page 431 of the records of Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
3. There was no intervening conveyance of a rea' 
property interest by any party between the 16th day of December 
1983 and the 29th day of May, 1984 and the Deed of Partia" 
Reconveyance herein identified transferred legal title an< 
released all interest in and to real property in Sanpete County 
State of Utah and specifically described as follows: 
The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter 
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 12 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
4. That because the Deed of Partial Release hereii 
identified was effective and did fully reconvey the 
//c2 -
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property identified, the Plaintiff was not damaged in any respec 
by the fact that the document was not recorded until May 29 
1984. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court does no' 
enter the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Plaintiff has proved no damage by reason of acts 
omissions or conduct on the part of D Land Title and tha 
Defendant D Land Title is entitled to a judgment of no cause o: 
action, together with its costs incurred. 
B. In view of the findings and conclusions reached 
the crossclaim heretofore filed by D Land Title againsi 
cross-defendant Norma Wanlass should be dismissed since D Lane 
Title suffered no damage. 
DATED this 
*eaiP 
- /IS -
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY, 
r • " ' 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
/* 
SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DANIEL PACK; MARGARET A. 
GUNTERMAN; ACTION TITLE COMPANY,) 
TRUSTEE; T. P. FAMILY PARTNER-
SHIP; HOFFBUHER REDI-MIX INC.; 
WILLARD M. TUCKER; PHYLLIS 0. 
TUCKER; D LAND TITLE COMPANY; 
and all unknown persons who 
have or claim any right, title 
estate, lien or interest in 
the subject property, 
Defendants, 
) 
"%J^M>TU^ J&MCJL, 
D LAND TITLE COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NORMA S. WANLASS, 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO VACATE PREVIOUSLY-
EXECUTED FI _INGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 8978 
901 
Third-Party 
Defendant, 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, sitting at Manti, 
Sanpete County, State of Utah, on Wednesday, the 2nd day of April, 
1986, the matter having come before the Court upon Plaintiff's 
Motion to Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment heretofore executed by the Court and upon Plaintiff's 
further Motion to amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
- /J? -
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Judgment. The Court being fully advised in the matter does now 
ORDER: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment is hereby denied. 
2. Plaintiff's separate Motion to amend Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment is hereby denied. 
~/3f-
BRENT D. YOUNG 
JERRY L. REYNOLDS 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE ^OUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL PACK, MARGARET A. 
GUNTERMAN: ACTION TITLE COMPANY, 
Trustee; T.P. FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, 
HOFFBUHER REDI-MIX INC., WILLARD 
M. TUCKER, PHYLLIS 0. TUCKER: D 
LAND TITLE COMPANY, and all 
unknown persons who have or 
claim any right, title, estate, 
lien or interest in the subject 
property, 
Defendants. 
Based upon the stipulation of the plaintiff and defendants 
Daniel Pack and Action Title Company, ^nd based upon the 
evidence presented at trial on February 10, 1986, and for good 
cause showing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That title to the following described real property 
located in Sanpete County, State of Ut£h is quieted in plaintiff 
or their grantees as against the defendants and each of their. 
The Northeast one quarter of the Southwest one 
quarter of the Northwest one quarter of Section 
23, Township 12 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; according to the official plat 
thereof on file in the office of the Recorder, 
Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
Containing ten acres more or less* 
ituJll COJCX in A" 
PARTIAL JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. 8978 
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2. That defendant, Daniel Pack/, s granted an easement 
over an existing dirt roadway across the above described real 
property for purposes of maintenance of said road and ingress 
and egress to a cabin on nearby property known as the Hudson 
Cabin. 
3. That defendant Pack is granted an easement to maintain 
and existing plastic pipe waterline acposs the above described 
real property and to the right substitute therefore another 
waterline of the same size provided that said waterline is 
buried. Said waterline presently crosses the above described 
property and leads to the aforementioned Hudson cabin. 
1986. 
& ***** x- . \ *~ * 
MARK F. ROBINSON 
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